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been applied to newspaper publications4 and in two or three instances, to
cases of radio defamation.5 In these instances the court has predicated its
decision upon the analogy between newspaper publication and publication
by radio broadcasting. This analogy has been subjected to considerable dis-
cussion.6 The present case seems to be the first in which an appellate
court has formally rejected the analogy and consequently refused to ex-
tend the doctrine of absolute liability to radio defamation. The court here
said, "But where the circumstances like these now presented are such that
the defamation occurs beyond the control of the broadcaster, it is perfectly
clear that the analogy between newspapers and broadcasting companies
collapses completely * * * ",7 The holding of the present case seems to be
in line with numerous prior decisions in Pennsylvania restricting the doc-
trine of absolute liability.8 It is also in harmony with the trend of modern
authority that no man should be held liable for an unintentional injury
resulting from the performance of a lawful act without negligence or wilful
misconduct.9
D. L.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE--LIAILITY OF SuPrLiER OF CHATTELS-DANGEROUS
SUSTANCE-[Federal].-Defendant sent plaintiff, a chemistry teacher, on
the latter's request, a free set of oil samples showing various forms of oil
products. To insure safe shipment, defendant had substituted water for
kerosene. Although it labelled the vial "kerosene", it in no way informed
plaintiff of the substitution. After displaying the exhibit to the class,
plaintiff poured the contents of this vial over some metallic sodium. This
is the usual laboratory method for preserving the metal. Water, unlike
kerosene, reacts violently with sodium. The explosion which resulted de-
stroyed plaintiff's eye. Plaintiff brought suit for the injury and recovered
4. Peck v. Tribune Co. (1909) 214 U. S. 185; Oklahoma Pub. Co. v.
Givens (C. C. A. 10, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 62; Thorley v. Lord Kerry (1812)
4 Taunt. 355.
5. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
889; Sorenson v. Wood (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82; Irwin v.
Ashurst (1938) 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127; Miles v. Wasmer (1933) 172
Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847.
6. Opposing the analogy: Guider, Liability for Defamation in Political
Broadcasts (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 708, 713; Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts
(1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 725, 731; Farnum, Radio Defamation and the
American Law Institute (1936) 16 Boston U. L. Rev. 1, 6; Nash, The
Application of the Law of Libel and Slander to Radio Brodacasting (1938)
17 Ore. L. Rev. 307, 309. But cf.: Vold, The Basis for Liability for
Defamation by Radio (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 612, 644; Keller, Federal
Control of Defamation by Radio (1936) 12 Notre Dame Lawyer 134, 154.
7. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. (Pa. 1939) 8 A (2d)
302, 309.
8. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson (1886) 113 Pa. St. 126, 6 Atl.
453; Malone v. Pierce (1911) 231 Pa. 534, 80 At]. 979; Teller v. Hood
(1923) 81 Pa. Super. 443; Fredericks v. Atlantic Refining Co. (1925) 282
Pa. 8, 127 Atl. 615.
9. See Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 108; Ames, Law and Morals
(1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 99.
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in the court below. Defendant, contending that these facts show no negli-
gence on its part, appealed. Held, that there was sufficient evidence to
carry the case to the jury.'
The court, in its application of the law of negligence and proximate
cause, employs what is, in effect, the well-known approach of the Polemis
case2. In confronting the problem, the court says: "The real question is
whether the defendant's act, in substituting water for kerosene without any
warning of the substitution, is sufficiently unnatural to make an issue
properly to be submitted to the jury on the question of reasonableness of
its conduct."'3 The court upholds the right of the jury to find the mis-
labelling unreasonable even though its particular consequences are surpris-
ing, citing a number of cases in which damages were awarded where the
precise injury which resulted was just as surprising.
Each of these cases cited by the court as illustrating situations in which
the injury was surprising involves an act with regard to some article, sub-
stance, or condition which is usually accepted as actually or potentially
dangerous in itself: dry ice, 4 gasoline,5 street pavement,6 electric trans-
former7 soda water bottle,8 and auto wheel.9. The two sections of the
America Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts cited by the
court'0 likewise seem to contemplate action with regard to such an article,
substance, or condition. To have brought the instant case under the rule of
"dangerous article-surprising consequence" which these authorities illus-
trate, the court must have found most unusual circumstances to establish
that conduct here in relation to water was dangerous. The factual set-up-
the mislabelling water for kerosene, the possibility of laboratory use, the
chance of some harm through such use, et cetera-under which the conduct
thus becomes dangerous, even as under more usual circumstances conduct
with regard to gasoline and the like becomes dangerous, makes this case
virtually unique.
The line which divides the facts of the instant case from one in which
the defendant's acts violate no duty and create no unreasonable risk is a
fine one at best. This is illustrated by the distinction which the court seems
1. Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 183.
Contributory negligence, the second point on which appeal was made, also
failed.
2. In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd. [1921] 3 K. B. 560.
3. Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 183
186. Italics supplied.
4. New York Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Rataj (C. C. A. 3, 1934) 73 F. (2d)
184.
5. Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co. (1932) 260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112
aff'g 234 App. Div. 567, 256, N. Y. S. 323.
6. Payne v. City of New York (1938) 277 N. Y. 393, 14 N. E. (2d) 449,
115 A. L. R. 1495.
7. Rosebrock v. General Electric Co. (1923) 236 N. Y. 227, 140 N. B.
571.
8. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co. (1932) 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576.
9. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050,
Ann. Cas. 1916C 440, L. R. A. 1916F 696.
10. Restatement, Torts (1934) sec. 310 and sec. 388.
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to draw between the word "unnatural" as used in the passage quoted above
and the word "unusual" as employed by the court when it says, "This,
therefore, is one of those cases where not unusual human conduct pro-
duces results so unexpected and tragic as to startle and amaze."'" Is the
substition of water under the circumstances "not unusual," but, nevertheless
"unnatural"?
The opinion is of added interest because it is one of the first by Judge
Charles E. Clark, lately Dean of the Yale School of Law. It is characterized
by a clear style, analytical approach, a refreshing frankness, and by the
absence of the dogmatic formulae to which courts sometimes resort when
confronted by problems in this field. Judge Clark's use of law review
literature, 12 treatise material,13 and, particularly, of the American Law
Institute's restatement of the law,'4 is worthy of passing comment.
W. G. P.
11. Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 183,
185. Italics supplied.
12. Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from "Rational-
ization" (1938) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 36.
13. Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability (1906).
14. Restatement, Torts, (1934).
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